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ABSTRACT 
 
         In recent years, with corporate scandals and the global financial crisis there is 
continuous attention in the area of corporate governance which is the new concept in corporate 
world these days. It is seen as a moral duty and includes supporting the conformity to law and 
showing ethical guide. Corporate Governance is seen as a significant tool as firms’ financial 
performance when investors take an investment decision is turning into a more serious topic so 
the relationship between corporate governance tools and financial performance measurements 
caught researchers’ interest in the last decade primarily on developed countries as well as 
developing countries. In this study, we try to examine  the effects of corporate governance on 
corporate financial performance for Turkey, using a sample of 90 companies on BIST for the 
time period between 2008 and 2014. Like previous papers, board size, ceo duality, board 
committees, board independence, firm size and firm age are the independent variables and their 
effects were measured on financial variables that are ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q.Various tests 
were used to investigate the relationship such as descriptive analysis, pairwise correlation and 
ordinary least squares by using secondary data over a period.  
       Under the lights of this research, it was found that overall, corporate governance 
variables have significant impact on firm financial performance and market value 
measurements. When we look at it separately, while no significant relationship between board 
size and all dependent variables was found, board independence has a significant and positive 
impact on all measurement variables. Moreover, the association between Ceo duality and all 
dependent variables was negative and it was found that having high number of board 
committees is positively correlated with all measurement variables but only significantly related 
with ROA. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, corporate financial performance, Turkey 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
       Corporate governance has been gaining importance ever since the mid 80s and in recent 
years, with rising of competitive power, the importance of the corporate governance concept 
has reached appreciable level. It is defined as the “rules and practices by which companies are 
guided or run” and it also improves the relationship between the managers and shareholders of 
a corporation, as well as its stakeholders. It contributes to growth and financial stability by 
boosting up market assurance, financial market, integrity and economic efficiency 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD,2004) therefore inadequacy 
of corporate governance policy of public and private sector  is counted among the important 
reasons of the generated international financial crisis and company. It has become a concern 
both in developing and developed economies since previous financial scandals have increased 
demand for improved corporate governance practices (Baydoun et al 2013). The sudden 
disappearance of companies such as Enron and Worldcom which are prominent examples of 
world leading companies, showed that what is known about good company management needs 
to be thought through corporate scandals and mismanagements. This has caused the losses 
suffered by stakeholders of companies, primarily shareholders as a result the importance of 
corporate governance has increased further and becomes an essential part of financial markets, 
business and management. The reason for the concerns of corporate governance  coming to the 
foreground and the protection of its position in the next years is corporate scandals that have 
happened recently. In the latest years after the fiscal crises happening in US and major corporate 
bankruptcies, corporate governance concept came to the fore in Turkey as well in order to be 
in harmony with the world and attract the foreign capital inflow to Turkey. Because Turkey has 
different characteristics, its improvement is more slowly when it is compared with developed 
markets. However,  increasing need of foreign investment has boosted corporate governance 
applications in Turkey. 
        With the previous unfortunate incidents,  many authors have studied about the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance and interestingly found 
different results. Some of them found a positive association between corporate governance and 
firm performance  (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jackling and Johl, 
2009). Good corporate governance has become necessary for improving firm performance, 
establishing investor rights, enhancing the investment atmosphere and encouraging economic 
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development (Braga- Alves & Shastri, 2011) and has gained extensive fame in the stock market 
economy (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012). Another researches stated that corporate governance 
influence firm performance inversely (Yermack, 1996; Hutchinson and Gul, 2003; Mashayekhi 
and Bazaz, 2008). Moreover, according to Bhagat and Black, 2002, there is no relationship 
between corporate governance practises and firm financial performance. In this context, this 
study investigates this relationship for the case of Turkey. This is because, generally studies has 
concentrated on developed or developing countries but in this context Turkey is a special case 
because according to different organizations it is defined as both developed and developing 
countries. Moreover while there are studies related to relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance for Turkey, they were conducted by using different variables 
than independent variables that are used for this study. Since their variables are different, it is 
not possible to compare results with previous investigations. Therefore, it is found that there is 
a research gap for this case. Hence,  the focus for this study is exploring the impacts of corporate 
governance variables that are board size, board independence, ceo duality, board committees, 
firm age and firm size on corporate financial performance and market value that are ROA, ROE 
and Tobin’s Q.  
 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
It is obvious that corporate governance practices have many benefits for companies, 
countries and institutions. The most important benefits are rising business performance, easy 
access to low capital financial sources, efficient using of sources, positive image for company 
and country, providing security to investors, providing internal auditing to company, prevention 
of interest conflict and providing sustainability (Claessens, Djankor, Fan and Lang, 2003). They 
note that poor corporate governance not only causes low company performance but it can be 
also the reason for macroeconomic crises.  
         Although good corporate governance has benefits on financial performance,  in 
developing countries it still has shortcomings while in developed countries corporate 
governance is structured well and has good implications. As compared with developed 
countries, social, economic environments and traditional management understandings hinder to 
reach the good corporate governance practises in developing countries (Arif Saldanlı, 2012). 
           The previous researches have not concentrated on the economies that show the 
characteristics of  both developing and developed countries like Turkey. Different 
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organizations comprise different criterias to identify the country as developed or developing. 
Therefore while some organizations (Dow Jones, FTSE and MSCI) identify Turkey as 
developing, The CIA World Factbook defines Turkey as developed country. This lead to 
positioning of Turkey in the line between developed and developing countries. Hence it is not 
clear whether Turkish case will give same results with developing countries or developed ones. 
Moreover there are empirical studies that use same methodology and variables based on ceo 
duality, board independence, board committees and board size but in the cases for  Turkey this 
relationship is examined with different methodology and variables based on 4 principles scores 
that are public transparency and disclosure, stakeholders, shareholders and board of directors. 
Therefore, Turkey will be used as the case for this study and we  have considered to have same 
methodology with previous studies. By using the common methodology, we want compare our 
findings with the results of the other empirical studies that carried throughout the World. Hence 
firstly, this study might help us to enhance our understanding on the relationship of corporate 
governance and company’s financial performance specifically in Turkey and secondly we want 
to see whether the results are same with the other studies or not. So these reasons make the topic 
worthy and the thesis will be beneficial for Turkish companies in the sense of understanding to 
what extent can corporate governance affect firm performance and considering to increase 
application of corporate governance. 
 
1.3 Research Purpose and Question 
 
  From regulator perspective, there is a common belief regarding that good corporate 
governance applications have positive effect on firms’ financial performance but corporate 
governance indicators have different correlation on firm financial performance in every 
countries. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance 
applications of listed Turkish companies  can affect their firm performance. To achieve this 
purpose, the following questions are presented: 
1. To provide an analysis that examine to what extent  do the various components of 
corporate governance which are board size, board independence, board committees, 
CEO duality, firm age and firm size influence the firm performance that are measured 
by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, by the help of percentages of companies’ compliance.  
2. To see whether the results from this paper will be similar with past studies that use same 
methodology for an other countries.  
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3. To analyze the relationship between CMB’s recommendations and compliance of 
companies with them in order to understand whether compliance with advices ensure 
better corporate governance implementations.  
 
1.4 Study Limitations 
 
   Sampled companies were chosen from only BIST that includes all listed companies. 
Therefore, unlisted companies could not be analyzed due to lack of information about their 
operations. The assessment of the relationship in small companies and financial institutions are 
not in the context of the research. The main source of data for this study is annual reports so 
when the companies do not publish their annual reports for some years or do not include special 
information that we need in this study, this hinders to reach the information source. Hence, 
there are some missing observations in this paper.  
 
 
1.5 Report Structure 
 
This Master thesis comprises of six chapters. 
Section 1 gives the general background of the research, states problem discussion, research 
purpose and question and study limitations. 
Section 2 gives details about background about corporate governance in Turkey, its 
improvement, its enhancing and CMB’s indexes, 
Section 3 presents literature review which provides general background about corporate 
governance, theoretical framework for corporate governance and previous empirical studies’ 
findings about the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance, 
Section 4 gives details about how the study will be conducted, 
Section 5 presents the data interpretation of our empirical study, 
Section 6 concludes the thesis. 
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2. SCOPES OF RESEARCH 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance In Turkey 
 
     In order  to increase the positive effect of capital markets on financial development and 
to improve  corporate governance practices in Turkey, especially in the latest years after the 
fiscal crises happening in US and the major corporate bankruptcies, several regulations have 
been developed. The OECD Corporate Governance Principles that have been used as an 
example by the World were also taken as basis in studies done in Turkey. But the existing 
corporate structure in Turkey has many differences compared to its developed market 
counterparts. Some of the significant differences are that (Arif Saldanlı, 2012): 
 Most corporations are run by families. 
 Big groups in different industries dominate markets with horizontal growth. 
 The number of publicly held firms is low. 
 The percentage of capital stock is low. 
With these qualities, Corporate Governance in Turkey develops more slowly than the other 
developed markets. However, the present increasing need for foreign investment has a positive 
effect on Corporate Governance implementations. 
According to the ‘’Investors in the Emerging Markets Survey’’ carried out by the consulting 
firm McKinsey, investment criteria for an emerging market such as Turkey are; 
 Compatibility with Corporate Governance Principles 
 Transparency of reporting 
 Clear distinction between family relations and company management. (Cuhruk & 
Özkan, 2004) 
      The concept of Corporate Governance was first introduced to Turkey by the Turkish 
Industry & Business Association (TUSIAD) in 2002 as titled ‘‘Corporate Governance- Best 
Application Code’’ based on the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles. Because the board 
of directors plays the biggest role in the well application and implementation of corporate 
governance in Turkey, the formation of the board of directors, its independence and its agenda 
were heavily focused on in the aforementioned study. This published code was aimed for 
primarily the public corporations and others to voluntarily follow as guidance for the 
management and structure of boards of directors (KAP, 2002). Even though Corporate 
Governance- Best Application Code is limited to the board of directors, it started the discussion 
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of Corporate Governance in Turkey. Members of the study group founded the Corporate 
Governance Association of Turkey (TKYD) in 2003. This association made an important 
contribution to the recognition and the widespread of corporate governance in Turkey. In the 
same year, Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB), in parallel with the applications around 
the world, published ‘’Principles of Corporate Governance’’ aimed primarily at public 
corporations and also at all anonymous firms operating in public and private sectors. This report 
was also based on OECD’s ‘’Principles of Corporate Governance’’. (KAP 2002) 
        In February 2005, this report was revised in parallel with OECD’s updated version 
published in July 2003. Principles consist of four main segments; shareholders, public 
disclosure and transparency, stakeholders and the Board of directors. Public Corporations are 
only expected to follow these rules voluntarily. In addition to this, ‘comply or explain’ principle 
was adopted. This principle predicts whether or not the mentioned principles were applied 
properly and if it is not applied, company should explain it.(TKYD, 2015) 
         In addition to this, these principles enforce the companies, whose shares are traded on 
BIST, to prepare and publish the Corporate Governance Compliance Report from 2005. This 
report is published in annual reports and on firms’ web sites every year and it aims to show the 
firm behaviour across the corporate governance practices to investors. In this report, the 
principles in CMB’s Principles of CG will be specified and shown if they are followed by firms 
or not. Regarding the ones which are not followed, the reasons for not following and the 
consequences of not following will be clarified. (TKYD, 2015) After these developments BIST 
created the Corporate Governance Index in 2005 in order to help the application of CG, 
encourage companies to reference each other, measure the CG level of public corporations and 
to help investors make decisions (Kılıç, 2008). In 2006, in order to inspect CG applications 
‘’Corporate Governance in Turkey: A Pilot Study’’ was published by OECD. It entailed points 
regarding the development of CG in Turkey. Following this rearrangement CMB’s CG 
evaluation principles were revised. Two innovations were introduced by a notification from 
CMB in 2008 in order to resolve the problems with application and to increase the applicability 
of CG. Following the 2008, CMB has published new communiques in 2011 and 2014 to have 
better corporate governance application (See Table 1). 
        The concept of Corporate Governance was first included in the Turkish Commercial Code 
as well in 2012. The code also includes some regulations concerning CG applications that are 
obligatory for both public anonymous companies and some other types. Turkish Commercial 
Code contributed to the notion of CG in the following points:   CMB’s monopolistic authority 
on regulations, board of directors’ management explanation, right to accession, conglomerate, 
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standards of financial reporting, inspection, board of directors, general board and protection of 
shareholders.  
 
 
Table 1: 2011 and 2014 Communique on Corporate Governance by CMB 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLES 
II-17.1 COMMUNIQUÉ ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
BY CMB 
(Published in the Official Gazette 
dated 3 January 2014 and 
numbered 28871) 
IV- 56 COMMUNIQUÉ ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
BY CMB 
(Published in the Official Gazette 
dated 3 December 2011 and 
numbered 28158) 
BOARD SIZE 4.3.1. ‘‘The number of members 
of the board of directors, provided 
that the number is not less than 
five in any case, shall be 
determined in order to ensure that 
the board members conduct 
productive and constructive 
activities, make rapid and rational 
decisions and efficiently organize 
the formation and activities of the 
committees.’’ 
4.3.1. ‘‘The number of members 
of the board of directors, provided 
that the number is not less than 
five in any case, shall be 
determined in order to ensure that 
the board members conduct 
productive and constructive 
activities, make rapid and rational 
decisions and efficiently organize 
the formation and activities of the 
committees.’’ 
BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE 
(Non-executive 
members) 
4.3.2. ‘‘A Majority of the 
members of the board of directors 
shall consist of members who do 
not have an executive duty. A 
Non-executive member of the 
board of directors shall be the 
person who does not have any 
administrative duty other than 
being a board member or any 
executive unit subsidiaries to 
himself/herself and is not involved 
in the daily work routine or 
ordinary activities of the 
corporation.’’ 
4.3.2. ‘‘A Majority of the 
members of the board of directors 
shall consist of members who do 
not have an executive duty. A 
Non-executive member of the 
board of directors shall be the 
person who does not have any 
administrative duty other than 
being a board member or any 
executive unit subsidiaries to 
himself/herself and is not involved 
in the daily work routine or 
ordinary activities of the 
corporation.’’ 
BOARD 
COMMITTEES 
4.5.1. ‘‘Board of directors shall 
form an “Audit Committee” 
(except for banks), “Early 
Detection of Risk Committee” 
(except for banks), “Corporate 
Governance Committee”, 
“Nomination Committee, 
Compensation Committee” 
(except for banks) in order to 
fulfill its duties and 
4.5.1. ‘‘Board of directors shall 
form an “Audit Committee” 
(except for banks), “Early 
Detection of Risk Committee” 
(except for banks), “Corporate 
Governance Committee”, 
“Nomination Committee, 
Compensation Committee” 
(except for banks) in order to 
fulfill its duties and 
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responsibilities in a reliable way. 
However, in case that a separate 
nomination committee and 
compensation committee cannot 
be established due to the structure 
of the board of directors, corporate 
governance committee shall fulfill 
the duties of such committees.’’(It 
is deduced that Turkish firms 
should have at least 3 committees 
in their board.) 
responsibilities in a reliable way. 
However, in case that a separate 
early detection of risk committee 
nomination committee and 
compensation committee cannot 
be established due to the structure 
of the board of directors, corporate 
governance committee shall fulfill 
the duties of such committees.’’(It 
is deduced that Turkish firms 
should have at least 2 committees 
in their board.) 
CEO DUALITY 4.2.5. ‘’Authorities of the 
chairman of the board of directors 
and the chief executive 
officer/general manager shall be 
explicitly separated and this 
separation shall be set forth in the 
articles of association in written 
form. No one in the corporation 
shall be delegated with limitless 
decision-making authority.’’ 
4.2.6. ‘‘In case it has been 
resolved that the chairman of the 
board of directors and the chief 
executive officer/general manager 
would be the same person, this 
situation shall be disclosed at PDP 
with its grounds.’’ 
4.2.5. ‘’Authorities of the 
chairman of the board of directors 
and the chief executive 
officer/general manager shall be 
explicitly separated and this 
separation shall be set forth in the 
articles of association in written 
form. No one in the corporation 
shall be delegated with limitless 
decision-making authority.’’ 
4.2.6. ‘‘In case it has been 
resolved that the chairman of the 
board of directors and the chief 
executive officer/general manager 
would be the same person, this 
situation shall be disclosed at PDP 
with its grounds.’ 
 
 
2.2 Enhancing The Corporate Governance in Turkey 
 
               In this part previous and current corporate governance positionings in Turkey will be 
explained with the help of two researches.  
         First research was done by CMB to determine to what extent do the companies that enter 
IMKB 100 Index actually apply corporate governance principles  and to what extent are these 
companies transparent to public and their stakeholders (CMB, 02.05.2008, weekly bulletin no. 
2008/18). The result of this study  reveals that even the top 100 companies, that entered IMKB 
100 among all 319 companies, according to their market values and transaction volume criteria, 
do not apply the corporate governance principles adequately and have incomplete reports of 
corporate governance compliance (Saim Kılıç, 2011). 
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        The second report was prepared by StratejiCo to measure the corporate governance 
perception in Turkey with the occasion of  TKYD’s 10th year (2013). The most important 
finding from this research was that although there is increase in corporate governance 
application during the period, there are still problems. Most notable obstacles in front of 
corporate governance are the personal misconceptions from executive positions regarding loss 
of authority. In other words, while corporate governance is seen as a part of the resolution 
process, it is ignored by managers that do not want to share the authority to take decision. This 
is especially the case in cities outside of Istanbul because in these cities, the founding family 
members have a remarkable say in the company management. Participants that see failure in 
the distribution of authority in the decision-making process regard it as a threat to the 
company’s sustainability, see the sustainability and continuity of the operations after the 
founder as one of the supporting factors. Also they consider these factors to naturally improve 
the company’s reputation. In this report, the importance of professional managers was 
emphasized by participants to raise public awareness on corporate governance. However when 
it comes to the point of adoption and application of the principles of corporate governance, 
attitudes of firm owners and especially first generation family members are crucial. Most 
participants defend that corporate governance will not be successfully applied unless members 
of the family, that have established the company, are convinced to do so. In this research, it is 
deduced that public institutions are the most confided group regarding corporate governance 
practices (TKYD 10. Th year Report).  
             In summary, according to these researches, it can be concluded that corporate governance 
in Turkey is developing but it is still not well developed and the coercive effect of the state is 
still the most powerful factor. Hence, more coercive interventions from the state and more laws 
in place are needed to have better established corporate governance in Turkey. 
 
2.3 BIST and BIST Indexes 
 
              BIST (formerly known as IMKB) is the abbreviation for Borsa Istanbul.Stocks are traded 
on BIST, which was founded  by bringing together VOB and Istanbul Gold Exchange. 
Companies that want to make their shares public for the first time get permission from SPK and 
sell them through intermediary institutions. The transactions that take place after the first sale 
are carried out through BIST. So the second hand sale of a share takes place on BIST. 
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      BIST 100 Index; is used as the main index for BIST. It consist of 100 firms, selected from 
companies that are traded on the National Market, Real Estate Investment Companies and 
Venture Capital Investment Trusts that are traded on Corporate Products Market 
      BIST 50 Index; consist of 50 firms, selected from companies that are traded on the National 
Market, Real Estate Investment Companies and Venture Capital Investment Trusts that are 
traded on Corporate Products Market. 
      BIST 30 Index; consists of 30 firms, selected from companies that are traded on the National 
Market, Real Estate Investment Companies and Venture Capital Investment Trusts that are 
traded on Corporate Products Market BIST 10 Bank Index: Includes 10 banks’ shares that are 
traded on the National Market and have the highest liquidity and market value among others. 
      BIST Corporate Governance Index; consists of the shares of companies that are traded on 
Istanbul Stock Exchange and that scored at least 7 points out of 10 according to the principles 
of compliance with corporate governance. 
      BIST All Index; consists of shares of the companies that are traded on the National Market and 
Second National Market, Real Estate Investment Companies and Venture Capital Investment 
Trusts that are traded on Corporate Products Market. 
 
 
3.LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
       Corporate governance is a modern management approach that is quite popular all over the 
world  for last 20 years. The dramatic rise of globalization in recent years has left companies 
under pressure to expand in international markets. In addition, globalisation has brought with 
changes in the structure of business management, strategy and major administration (Musteen 
et al., 2009: 321).With the effect of globalisation, investor decisions, increasing expansion of 
international trade, increased competition, rules implemented by stock exchanges, purchasing 
and acquisitions and firm valuation criteria, the importance of corporate governance issue 
continues to attract the attention of national and international organizations (Yavuz et al., 2015) 
and gain widespread prominence in the capital market economy (Adiloglu et al., 2012). Because 
of all these reasons, corporate governance has caught the attention of most scholars and 
corporate governance is touched upon in many studies. 
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3.1 Corporate Governance Concept 
 
   To have better application and efficient results, corporate governance concept and its 
legal system should be understood well. Corporate governance is an essential element of 
modern business and management approach. Likewise, corporate governance is an integral 
part of the strategic management. (Gürbüz&Ergincan, 2004:1).The main aim of the corporate 
governance is to provide good relationship among stakeholders.  
   While in a narrow perspective corporate governance incorporated the relationships among 
shareholders, managers, auditors and others related to business(Pandya, 2011), from a broader 
perspective, corporate governance covers whole market as investor confidence, efficient capital 
allocation and whole economy as wealth development and country welfare development that 
are important for the company (Fülöp, 2014). 
    Corporate governance has another two different views as well. While from the restraint 
view, corporate governance is seen as a law that helps the owners to accomplish their interests 
(Cretu, 2012), from the large view corporate governance is seen as the mechanism that helps to 
protect whole stakeholders’ interests (Cretu, 2012). 
    From TUSIAD’s viewpoint, in its broadest sense the concept of corporate governance is 
the regulation of any organization’s management that people creates to achieve some aims. In 
the narrow sense, corporate governance states all laws, regulations, codes of practice that enable 
attracting human and financial capital. (TUSIAD Report, 2002). 
      
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Definitions 
 
         Corporate governance is open concept so it has different meanings according to different 
scholars. Generally, it is the system that is governed and controlled by organizations. In 
particular it is related with the relationship between management and shareholders. While the 
Cadbury report on the Committee of the financial Assets of Corporate governance that was led 
by Sir Adrian Cadbury defines the phrase ‘corporate governance’ as the system by which 
companies are guided and guarded, OECD defines "Corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined." (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance) 
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        Generally it refers to the process and structure for inspecting the direction and management 
of a business entity, so that it carries out its objectives effectively (Report on the observance of 
standards and codes (ROSC) 2005; Bozec&Dia, 2007). As what O’Sullivan (2000) stated, one 
can intensify and influence economic and financial performance with the proper corporate 
governance practices. Accordingly, corporate governance plays an important role in the 
allocation of resources and returns. OECD (1999) has defined the corporate governance as 
‘‘Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled.’’ It means the practise of power on corporations through board of directors. (Tricker, 
2000). Mac Millan and Downing (1999) have identified the corporate governance as directed 
and controlled system to obtain high financial performance. 
 
3.3 Theories Related to Corporate Governance 
 
3.3.1Agency Theory 
 
      The origin of Agency theory come from economic theory that is revealed  by Alchian and 
Demsetz and it was developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The theory is specified as the 
relationship between agents and principals in the business. It is relevant with solving the 
problem between shareholders(principals) and managers(agents). Principals expect that 
agents  act and take  decisions for the interests of shareholders and work for maximizing  their 
wealth. This agency problem can occur in two situations; when interests of agents and principals 
don’t fall in line with each other and when principals and agents have different risk tolerances. 
Hence, the agency problem will cause inefficiencies, financial losses and agency cost which is 
determined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as ‘’the sum of monitoring expenditure by the 
principal to limit the aberrant activities of the agent; bonding expenditure by the agent which 
will guarantee that certain actions of the agent will not harm the principal or to ensure the 
principal is compensated if such actions occur; and the residual loss which is the dollar 
equivalent to the reduction of welfare as a result of the divergence between the agents decisions 
and those decisions that would maximize the welfare of the principal’’. 
              Many researches (Pearce&Zahra, 1992; Bhagat&Black, 1998; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Kiel 
& Nicholson, 2003) have emphasized on board composition because according to agency 
theory ,the first duty of board is maximizing shareholder value so within this framework agents 
are seen as managers, principals are owners and board are perceived as monitoring mechanism 
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(Mallin, 2004). Ceo duality is another tool to minimize the agency problem as well. When the 
positions of CEO and chairman of the board are held  by different people, agency problem 
decreases. This is because,in this case CEO is responsible for management and chairman is in 
charge of monitoring. Hence, principals’ interests can  be preserved from agents. 
 
 
3.3.2 Stakeholder theory 
            Stakeholder theory was well incorporated in management routine in 1970 but Freeman 
(1984) introduced corporate accountability to wider array of stakeholders.Contrary to agency 
theory, here managers are working for and assisting stakeholders, Stakeholder theory suggested 
that managers should have a system of associations among stakeholder. Also unlike agency 
theory that give more significance to the association of owner,employee and manager 
,for  stakeholder theory the network of them is more important(Freeman, 1999). However, 
according to Sundaram & Inkpen (2004),stakeholder theory refers to  a group of stakeholder 
who needs management’s interest. In addition, Donaldson & Preston (1995) mentioned that 
stakeholder consists of a group involved in a business to take advantages. On the other 
hand,  Clarkson (1995) suggests that aim of companies is to generate wealth for their 
stakeholders.  
              Freeman (1984) , network of associations among various groups may influence firm’s 
decision making process since stakeholder theory focuses on the essence of these associations 
regarding processes and consequences for companies and their stakeholders. Donaldson & 
Preston (1995)  stated that stakeholder theory concentrates on the interests of stakeholders as 
well as managerial decision making processes.  
 
  3.4  Good Corporate Governance and Its Importance  
 
      Good corporate governance means setting up a well management structure within the 
organisation to create and have a reassuring relations between company’s board of directors, 
the management, employees and shareholders to service the interests of shareholders, not 
ignoring all stakeholders’ interests (PTTPLC explanation) on the contrary ASX Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practices Recommendations (2003) defines good 
corporate governance as ‘ the structure that encourages companies to create value and provide 
accountability’.         
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      Corporate governance becomes an important assessment tool for investment choices 
because there are many empirical researches that show a positive correlation between corporate 
governance and financial performance. In other words, when the investors are on the decision 
process, they firstly look at corporate governance implications  and its compliance with 
regulations or advices .Therefore, corporate governance becomes an important key element of 
investment decision.  
        When benefits of corporate governance are examined from the perspective of companies, 
having high quality of corporate governance means low capital cost, increasing capacity of 
financing and liquidity and not excluding of well managed companies from capital markets 
(CMB, 2005:2). 
         On the other hand when this situation is analyzed through the perspective of Turkey, good 
corporate governance causes an improvement on the prestige of the country, prevention of 
outflow of capital, increase of foreign capital investments, increase of competitive power and 
capital markets, overcoming of crisis with less loss, distributing of resources more effectively 
and providing and maintaining of high prosperity (CMB, 2005:2). 
 
3.5 Associations Between Independent Variables and Firm Performance  
 
3.5.1 Board Size And Firm Performance 
  
    The size of board affects firm performance according to previous studies. A review of these 
empirical studies shows mixed results. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) supports Jensen(1983) who 
recommended the board size has optimal number of maximum of seven to eight members. 
Concurring with this, Sulaiman et al. (2012 ) states that the board size should be standardized 
and not should be too large or small. However, optimal board size should be determined in 
terms of industries because Adams and Mehran (2003) state that banks should have large boards 
while manufacturing firms must have less. According to Hackman (1990) Organizational 
behavior researchers note that larger boards decrease total productivity. Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) cite that if the board size become larger, the coordination will be difficult and value-
maximizing strategic decisions will be made hardly. According to Cheng (2008), large boards 
cause lower profitability since they are conservative and they take less risks. Chan and Li (2008) 
and De Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005) cite that larger boards mean poor performance 
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because when board size increases, monitoring becomes infective. According to Yermack 
(1996), there is inverse relationship between board size and firm performance. 
        On the other hand, there are also some findings about positive relationship between board 
size and firm performance. Mohamed (2009) conducted a study on sample of 174 financial 
institutions and savings-and-loan-holding companies between 1995 and 2002 and he states that 
large boards do not reduce firm performance. In addition, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), 
Klein (2002) and Monk and Minnow (1995) find that with the larger boards, quality of 
monitoring can be increased. Dehaene et al. (2001) find that board size is positively related with 
firm performance. Finally, Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) notes that there is no 
relationship between board size and firm performance. 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the board size and financial performance  
 
3.5.2 Ceo Duality and Firm Performance 
 
         Another dilemma experienced by companies is whether chairman of board of directors 
and CEO should hold different positions or not. Koufopoulos et al. (2010) cites that since CEO 
has an influential power on companies' strategic decisions, CEO that has dual role affect board's 
decisions and firm performance negatively. Also, Syriopoulos et al. (2012) notes that dual role 
has negative  impact on monitoring and decisions of board of directors. According to Dar et al. 
(2011), CEO and chairman might influence firm performance since if same person works for 
both positions, agency problem increases. In addition , Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990 ,Fama 
and Jensen, (1983), Rechner and Dalton, (1991) stated that separation of responsibilities will 
cause a rise in effectiveness of  monitoring and increase in the level of separation between board 
of directors and management. In addition, Brickley et al. (2005) showed that holding two 
positions by one person will lead to conflict of interests and higher agency problem. 
        Other researchers found that when CEO has dual role, organizations will ; have 
unequivocal and powerful leadership; extinguish possible conflict between CEO and chairman 
and eliminate the confusion of two representatives from the perspective of stakeholder. (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) 
also reported that there is positive relationship between dual leadership and firm performance. 
Consistent with these arguments, Simpson and Gleason (1999) found that when CEO  hold dual 
leadership, they are less probable to face with financial distress. Also, the stewardship theory 
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states that having single leader for both positions may lead to good governance with positive 
influence on financial performance due to combination of directions that accelerates decision-
making process. Feng, Goshan and Sirmans (2005) examined the relationship between BoD 
and Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) performance and they could not find any significant 
link between dual role and firm performance. All in all ,both views were discussed and the link 
between dual leadership and firm performance is mixed and indecisive. 
 
H2: There is a negative association between CEO/Chairman Duality and firm performance. 
 
 
3.5.3 Board Composition And Firm Performance 
 
         Another significant variable of corporate governance is board composition that means 
formal organization of Board of Directors. Abdullah (2004) states that the board of director 
consist of group of people who set strategic decisions and it has important roles to lead and 
direct the firm in order to achieve company's goals. It is crucial to provide that boards are 
independent from management. This is because, board composition can reduce principal–agent 
problem since participation of non-executive directors ensures to keep competitiveness of 
firms. 
         There have been many studies that examine the link between independent directors and 
firm performance and they gave mixed results. Some authors (Ezzamel & Watson, 1993; 
Hossain et al., 2001; Vance, 1964) reported a positive link between board composition and firm 
performance. According to Chen (2011) ,companies should have more non executive directors 
to provide efficient operations. Also, Lam and Lee (2012) noted that when boards have more 
independent non-executive members, boards become effective. Fama and Jensen (1983) also 
mentioned that non-executive directors can decrease agency problems and  make effective 
decisions. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Kinney (2006) 
suggested larger amount of independent directors that are assigned increase bond and credit 
ratings. Moreover, O’ Sullivan (2000) analyzed a sample of 402 UK firms and found that non-
executive directors ensure comprehensive audit. 
         Some studies support the negative relationship between board composition and firm 
performance. According to Yammeesri and Herath (2010) , if firm has more insider directors, 
its firm value will increase compared with the board having more outside directors. Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) and Yermack (1996) noted that there is a negative link between board 
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composition and firm performance measured by Tobin's Q. Klein (1998) also mentioned that 
market value of equity is negatively related with proportion of independent directors in the 
boards. Cornet et al. (2007) analyzed 100 largest firms in the U.S. as ranked by S&P and found 
that increasing proportion of independent directors causes a decrease in earnings management. 
In addition, the study conducted by Roodposhti and Chashmi (2010) in Iran found a negative 
relationship between board independence and earnings management. 
       Some scholars could not find any significant relationships between these variables. For 
example; Fogel and Geier (2007) stated that it is not guarantee that companies with large 
number of non-executive directors on their boards achieve good corporate governance. Dalton 
et al.,(2011) could not find any relationship between board independence and firm performance. 
Also , According to Byrd & Hickman, (1992); Chin, Vos & Casey, (2003); Daily & Dalton, 
(1992); Mace, (1986 ) , board composition and firm performance are not related significantly. 
As understood from previous studies , there are different results and  it is assumed that 
increasing proportion of non executive directors can boost firm performance so the hypothesis 
is ; 
 
H3: There is a positive link between board composition and firm performance. 
 
3.5.4 Board Committees And Firm Performance 
 
       Number of Board committees are also important measurement for firm performance 
according to the past studies. McMullen, (1996 ) reported that firms which have audit 
committees have less financial distress. Klein (2002b) mentions that independent audit 
committees decrease probability of earnings management so it can increase transparency. On 
the other hand , Baxter (2006) could not find any relationship between the quality of firm's 
financial reports and presence of audit committees. Main and Johnston (1998) and Weir and 
Laing (2000) argue that existence of remuneration committee leads to beneficial impact on firm 
performance. According to Klein (1998) ,there is a positive link between remuneration 
committee and firm performance but not significantly. Abbott et al., (2004) , the presence of 
audit committees can decrease mistakes and abnormalities and Carcello and Neal, (2000), noted 
that it affects the decisions of credit rating agencies in a positive way. 
 Comparing to other variables, studies related to link between board committees and firm 
performance are few so it is assumed that there is positive relationship. 
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H4: There is positive link between the presence of board committees and firm performance. 
 
3.5.5 Firm Size and Firm Performance 
 
         Some studies states that there is a positive relationship between firm size and firm’s 
financial performance (Black et al., 2006) (Serrasqueiro&Nunes, 2008). This is because,when 
the firm size increase,generating internal fund and accessing external capital become easier. 
When the firm size increases, diversification in company’s operations increases as well and this 
leads to confusion in management (Fama&Jensen, 1983; Boone et al., 2007). With this 
confusion, larger firms require more counseling than smaller firms on board and this will lead 
to more efficient and more diversified company strategies, hence larger companies might 
generate a better financial performance than smaller companies. 
         On the other hand, there are some studies that show negative relationship between firm 
size and financial performance. Larger firms need more monitoring (Nenova, 2003; Garen, 
1994; Agrawal&Knoeber, 1996) which ends up creating extra costs for firms. (Nenova, 2003) 
From different viewpoint, when the firm size increases, management might loss its control on 
the strategic and operational decisions and this might be end up with less efficiency (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996). Lastly, it is argued that the probability of meeting with agency problem is 
higher for large firms so it will cause a decrease in firm performance. Moreover, because large 
firms should have more advanced internal control than small firms , the cost of auditing increase 
to be able to act according to stakeholders’ interests.(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
H5: There is a negative association between firm size and firm performance 
 
 
3.5.6 Firm Age and Firm Performance 
 
        There are some researches that used the firm age as control variable when they analyzed 
the its effect on firm financial performance. They emphasize on the importance of firm age in 
terms of expected growth opportunity.  
        Old and large companies have better compliance with the advices of  public authorities, 
better reputation, more opportunities to access the external capital. Also, they have lower risk 
of financial distress and less growth opportunities(Claessens et al., 2002). Nevertheless, young 
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and small companies might have better growth opportunities but higher risk for financial 
distress. While old companies have more experience and skills, they are less dynamic and are 
not good at adapting changes (Evans, 1987; Boone et al., 2007). 
         Small and young companies earn less profit than older and larger companies because  they 
are new in the market and they must spend more effort to show their presence in the market 
Nevertheless, they are better than older firms in adapting new business 
environments(Lipczinsky and Wilson, 2001). Since young companies are at the beginning of 
growth stage,they might catch better growth opportunities(Black et al., 2006). 
 
H6: There is negative relationship between firm age and firm performance 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
 
4.1  Research Design 
 
     The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between variables of  corporate 
governance  and financial performance for Turkish listed companies. This section describes the 
research methods to test the hypotheses presented above. Therefore analysis relies on 
quantitative approach which is the most proper method to measure this relationship, to test the 
hypotheses and answer the research questions. In this chapter,  statistical analysis and tables are 
used to support  this study. The section follows with an explanation of the methodology used 
for research design, data sources and collection, variable descriptions, model specification and 
data analysis. 
 
4.2 Sampling, Data Sources And Collection 
 
     The research has been conducted on 90 listed Turkish firms that are traded in BIST. 
Companies were chosen from among the best 100 companies (BIST 100 index) 
because  findings and results of this study will be more readily comparable, reliable and more 
informative. Furthermore, with the use of the best firms it is easier to obtain information about 
their corporate governance practices due to the their well organized and extensive annual 
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reports. In the research, financial institutions and insurance companies were excluded because 
financial institutions have different accounting standards which makes the results incomparable 
with non financial firms  and having many fluctuations in the financial position of financial 
institutions creates volatile results. (Ferreira Caixe&Krauter, 2014; Moradi et al., 2012). 
Therefore, financial institutions and insurance companies were excluded from the sample as 
well as companies that do not have all the required information. However, after removing these 
companies from the sample,  90 companies that is our aim for number of sampled data could 
not be collected. In order to complete the sample, remaining companies were taken from other 
BIST indices (See Appendix 14). The sampling period is decided to be between 2008-2014 in 
the study because between these years we expect to see improvement in corporate governance 
practices of firms in parallel with the revisions of CMB. 
          In our analysis we used secondary data which was obtained from BIST, KAP, TKYD and 
CMB, firms’ web sites and annual reports to analyze and evaluate the variables which are firm’s 
establishment year, book value of total assets, book value of total liabilities, share price, number 
of issued shares, net income, number of board members, presence of ceo duality, number of 
board committees and number of non executive directors. 
 
4.3 Variable Descriptions 
 
         Three types of variables which are corporate governance (independent), control variables 
(independent) and variables for financial performance (dependent), are conducted in this paper.  
 
4.3.1 Corporate Governance Variables 
 
         In this paper, the variables below were used as corporate governance indicators because 
they are the building blocks of corporate governance. While transforming the information in 
annual reports of companies to our sampled data for analysis, we followed the same procedure 
as the previous studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 
Table 2: Corporate Governance Variables (Explanatory-Independent) 
Independent 
Variables 
Definition Measurement 
-Explanatory 
Variables 
  
BOSIZ Board Size Number of total board members 
BOIND Board 
Independence 
Ratio of non-executive members over total board 
members 
BOCOM Board Committees Number of total board committees 
CEODUA Ceo Duality Coded ''1'' if chairman also holds the position of Ceo 
and ''0'' otherwise  
 
 
4.3.2 Financial Performance Variables 
 
        Different studies have used different ratios and measurements to investigate  firm 
performance. Most of the studies tried to estimate the firm performance with the help of several 
financial measures such as Tobin‘s Q (Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003), ROA (Yermack, 1996; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Shrader et al., 1997; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003), ROE (Bhagat et al., 1999; Adjaoud et al., 2007), ROI (Boyd, 1995; Adjaoud 
et al., 2007) and net profit margin (Bauer et a,l., 2004). 
         In this research, financial performance variables are dependent variables in the regression 
and two accounting based measures which are ROA and ROE are used because they are the 
most common ratios used to measure financial performance (Adewale&Rahmon, 2014) and 
higher ROA and ROE show higher financial performance (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Habbash & 
Bajaher, 2014; Vo&Nguyen, 2014). Accounting based measures use audited accounting data 
and this ensures a more reliable and clear perspective towards companies therefore market does 
not distort these measures. Because they are based on book values, these measures less volatility 
and more reliable than market based indicators like stock returns, share prices, etc. (Lopez et 
al., 2007). As the final financial performance variable, Tobin’s Q which entails market value of 
equity, is assigned to examine the  firm performance from the market aspect. While market 
value based measures are criticized by some scholars, on the other hand, they consider the 
investors’ perceptions of the company’s potential performance (Daily, Dalton&Canella, 2003). 
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According to Haniffa&Hudaib (2006) there is no certain result that shows which measure is the 
best when you examine firms’ financial performance. 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Accounting Based Measurements  (ROA)- (ROE) 
 
         ROA provides a general understanding of companies’ characteristics (Kim, 2005) and 
shows  actual company performance (Ponnu, 2008). It is a good ratio to evaluate how the 
company efficiently uses its total assets when it generates profit. ROE focuses on return to 
company shareholders, it provides a quick and easy way to give an idea about company and it 
gives a trustworthy performance measure for shareholders (Johnson and Greening, 1999). From 
a shareholder perspective, ROE is seen as a significant ratio when analyzing firm’s financial 
performance because of its focus on shareholders’ returns (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Mehran 
1995).  
        Different studies remark different advantages of using ROA and ROE when analyzing 
firm performance. Firstly, ROA and ROE extinguish the problem of firm size. When there is a 
comparison among firms, they provide an effective and basic results (Lev and Sunder, 
1979).  According to  Demsetz&Lehn, (1985), ROA and ROE are better at showing the year to 
year fluctuations than market value based measures since market is very sensitive to changes. 
Because of  these reasons ROA and ROE are selected as financial performance measurements 
for this study. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Market Based Measurement (Tobin’s Q)  
 
         As final dependent variable, also to look from a different perspective, Tobin’s Q was used 
in the regression to measure firm value in the financial market. This measure is one of the most 
used financial performance measure as a dependent variable in empirical researches. (Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 1996; Chung & Pruitt, 1994; Hossain et al., 2001; Kang & Stulz, 1996; 120 
Loderer&Peyer, 2002; Perfect&Wiles, 1994; Reddy et al., 2008) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
Palia (2001) and Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) have used Tobin’s Q in their study to evaluate 
firms. This measure calculates the market value for one unit of assets and represents market 
value of firm without ignoring risks and warping the results (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Habbash et 
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al., 2014). On the other hand, Tobin’s Q is strongly influenced by unstable factors, such as 
investor behaviour, and market forecasts because it is based on the financial market . 
 
Table 3: Firm Performance Variables (Dependent Variables) 
Dependent 
Variables 
Definition Measurement 
ROA Return On 
Asset 
Ratio of net income over total book value of asset 
ROE Return On 
Equity 
Ratio of net income over total book value of equity 
TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q (Market value of equity+book value of liability)/book value 
of asset 
 
 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
 
 
         Beside the explanatory and explained variables, control variables were used to investigate 
the firm financial performance. Different studies (Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Shin and 
Stulz, 2000; Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006) have used different control variables. In 
this study firm size and firm age are used as control variables. 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Firm size 
 
         To follow the same way with previous studies (Zhu and Tian,2009; Anderson&Reeb, 
2004; Muth&Donaldson, 1998; Al-Matari et al., 2012), this study used the total asset as a proxy 
of firm size by using the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm size was used in this study to 
examine its likely effect on financial performances of  Turkish firms.  
 
 
4.3.3.2 Firm Age 
 
          Firm age is calculated as the each year minus establishment date of the company to 
determine how many years it had been incorporated before 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
and 2014.  
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Table 4: Corporate Governance Variables (Control-Independent Variables) 
Independent Variables Definition Measurement 
-Control Variables   
FIRSIZ Firm Size Natural logarithm of 
book value of firm's 
total asset  
FIAGE Firm Age Years since 
establishment 
 
  
ROA=α+ β(1)*BOCOM+β(2)*BOIND+β(3)*BOSIZ+β(4)*CEODUO+β(5)* FIAGE+β(6)*FIRSIZ 
  
ROE=α+ β (1)*BOCOM+β (2)*BOIND+β(3)*BOSIZ+β(4)*CEODUO+β (5)* FIAGE+β (6)*FIRSIZ 
  
TOBIN’S Q=α+ β(1)*BOCOM+β (2)*BOIND+β (3)*BOSIZ+β(4)*CEODUO+β(5)* FIAGE+β(6)*FIRSIZ 
 
 
5. DATA INTERPRETATION 
 
The key purpose of this study is to find answers for six research hypotheses which are the 
followings; 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the board size and financial performance 
H2: There is a negative association between CEO/Chairman Duality and firm performance. 
H3: There is a positive link between board composition and firm performance. 
H4: There is positive link between the presence of board committees and firm performance. 
H5: There is a negative association between firm size and firm performance 
H6: There is negative relationship between firm age and firm performance 
 
         In order to answer the research hypotheses, the study starts with descriptive analysis to 
show  mean, mode, median, maximum and minimum values of variables to describe them 
separately.  Secondly, pairwise correlation was conducted to show relationship among 
independent variables and test the multicollinearity problem in sampled data. In this study panel 
data was used with 90 companies and the time period 2008-2014, in this way same cross 
sectional unit was treated over time with 630 observations. Using the panel data provides 
combining time series and cross sectional data and eliminate high collinearity variables 
(Baltagi&Giles,1998; Gujarati, 2003). Then the ordinary least square was employed to establish 
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if corporate governance indicators have an effect on company financial performance. In 
addition, white correlated standard errors is used to extinguish heteroscedasticity problem in 
data set. This study’s analyses  were run with the help of Excel and EViews programmes. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis  
 
        The analysis begins with examining the basic features of the data using descriptive 
statistics. Table 5 represents 7 years summary of mean, median, maximum values, minimum 
values,  standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera probability of dependent, control, 
independent variables and dependent variables from 2008 to 2014. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Analysis 
 
Sütun1 BOCOM BOIND BOSIZ CEODUO FIAGE FIRSIZ ROA ROE TOBIN_S_Q 
        Mean  2.268761  0.642207  7.998255  0.214660  44.41187  8.596229  0.068425  0.120096  1.240367 
        Median  2.000000  0.666667  7.000000  0.000000  43.00000  8.770587  0.050870  0.103470  0.828159 
        Maximum  5.000000  1.000000  16.00000  1.000000  88.00000  10.50346  3.081646  3.596965  25.01065 
        Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  3.000000  0.000000  11.00000  5.854715 -1.281 -6.357  0.025769 
  Std. Dev.  1.090816  0.249668  2.290524  0.410945  17.20439  0.963177  0.184432  0.420155  2.242832 
        Skewness  0.374928 
-
0.526174 
 0.806760  1.389917  0.295544 
-
0.797648 
 8.656615 -3.819  7.063045 
        Kurtosis  2.678095  2.380004  3.469537  2.931870  2.603573  3.120322  142.2993  118.9355  61.92041 
        Jarque-
Bera 
 15.89853  35.61749  67.42088  184.6044  12.09365  61.10681  470433.9  322298.1  87648.96 
        Probability  0.000353  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.002365  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 
        Firstly, the average of board committees is 2,25 with the minimum of zero and a maximum 
of 5.  As you can see on the table 1 above CMG indicates that number of board committees 
should be at least three in 2014 revision, should be two in 2011 revision and there is no 
expression about requirement of board committees in 2008 revision. Hence the mean shows 
that there is a weak presence of compliance with CMB’s Communique according to 2014 
revision (See Table 1; 4.5.1). 
        The average of ceo duality is 0,21 with the maximum of 1 and minimum of 0. This finding 
shows that most of sampled companies have different people that hold ceo and chairman 
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positions  in the company. At the same time the mean shows that most of companies adapt to 
the CMB’s recommendations (See Table 1; 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 ) 
        Board independence has an average of 0,639, ranging from 0 to 1. Overall this result 
implies that most of  board of directors in sampled firms consist of non-executive members. 
Since the mean is larger than 0,5 that is non-executive members over total board members, it is 
understood that sampled companies complied with CMB’s recommendations about the board 
independence principle (See Table 1; 4.3.2.). 
        The average of board size is 7,97 with the minimum of 3 and a maximum of 16. 
Jensen(1983) and Lipton&Lorsh(1992) recommend the board size has optimal number of 
maximum of seven to eight members and with the maximum number of 10 to be effective. 
Mean of sample companies’ board size support their suggestion  with the number of 7,97. But 
the maximum number of board size from the descriptive statistics is 16 so this seems much 
higher than their findings. Also it is seen that sampled firms complied with CMB’s communique 
because mean of 7,97 is bigger than 5 that is suggested by CMB (See Table 1; 4.3.1) 
       As control variable, the mean of firm age is 44, ranging from 11 to 88. This result shows 
that data from sample companies vary in different ages which may make the result more 
accurate. 
       Firm size is a control variable which has a range 5,85 and 10,5 with the mean of 8,59. It is 
possible to deduce that sampled companies vary in different sizes hence we get a reliable 
conclusion. 
       The mean of ROA is 6,5% and the mean of ROE is 11%. Both financial performance 
measures have positive numbers implying the majority of sampled firms have created 
shareholder value over 2008-2014 period.  However there is wide deviation between minimum 
and maximum values of ROA and ROE. In addition, since ROA and ROE have negative 
minimum values there might be a sign of economic downturn. While this paper was 
being  analysed, it is obviously seen that Turkey had experienced with global crisis during 2008 
and 2009 through low ROA and ROE values. Also, TUSIAD clarifies this economic downturn 
in its 2009 Economic Report. 
 
      ‘‘The continuous growth of Turkey that lasted for seven years, decreased  in 2009 with only 
4.7% growth following the global crisis. All sectors suffered shrinkage except the financial 
sector. Private sector had a problem with financial resources as well as loss of production. The 
growing intuitive approach of the banks on risk and narrowing of foreign loans had a negative 
 29 
 
impact on domestic credit volume. Therefore the slowing flow of credit towards real sector 
caused a financial distress.’’ 
 
         Moreover, mean of Tobin’s Q is 1,21 which is higher than 1 so firms have created value 
for shareholders. Tobin’s Q of 1,21 might mean that market value of equity is higher than total 
asset carrying value. Here the remarkable thing is maximum value of Tobin’s Q which is 25 
because this measurement is based on the market value of firm and price of shares might change 
incredibly.  
 
  5.2 Pairwise Correlation Between Independent Variables 
 
       This analysis was used to test the study to determine whether there is a multicollinearity 
problem or not by understanding the relationship among all independent variables. This 
problem occurs when two or more independent variables are highly correlated with each other 
and this might affect the regression in a negative way (Hair et al., 2010). According to Gujarati 
(2003) high correlation among independent variables might make the regression unreliable. 
Table 6 exhibits a correlation matrix, which explains the correlation of independent variables 
related to this research. 
 
Table 6: Pairwise Correlation 
 BOSIZ BOIND BOCOM CEODUA FIRSIZ FIAGE 
BOSIZ 1      
BOIND 0,126593 1     
BOCOM 0,357087 0,084932 1    
CEODUA -0,19821 -0,07766 -0,15553 1   
FIRSIZ 0,125616 0,204829 0,0707513 0,06395439 1  
FIAGE 0,120005 0,049487 0,059979 -0,0229767 0,290214 1 
 
        
         As shown  above, board size has a positive relationship with board independence (0,127), 
board committees (0,357),  firm size (0,126) and firm age (0,12) but  is negatively correlated 
with ceo duality (-0,198). While board independence is positively correlated with board 
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committees (0,085), firm size (0,205) and firm age (0,049), board independence is negatively 
correlated with ceo duality (-0,077).  Board committees has negative relation with ceo duality 
(-0,15,)  but it is positively related with firm size (0,07) and firm age (0,059). Although firm 
size has a positive association with firm age (0,29), ceo duality has a negative relationship with 
firm age (-0,023) but positive association with firm size (0,06). 
        The highest correlation is between board size and board committees. This positive 
correlation was expected since as the number of board of directors increase members that might 
be nominated to board committees increase as well. In other words, more board committees can 
be constituted with different board members. 
        Firm age and firm size have the second highest correlation among all independent variables 
with the number of 0,29. It is also an expected result because older companies are able to have 
more total assets over the period.  
        The lowest correlation is seen between firm age and ceo duality in a negative way. This 
outcome means that when firm age increases, possibility of ceo and chairman that hold same 
position in the company decreases. Because a certain portion of the aged companies are run by 
families in Turkey, we expected that  a person from family hold same position. 
        Firm size has positive relationships with all independent variables but we expected 
that  firm size and ceo duality to have negative relationship like the relationship between  firm 
age and ceo duality but surprisingly test shows that they are positively correlated. 
       Overall the all outcomes are smaller than 0,80 which is the critical level to determine the 
multicollinearity problem (Hair et al., 2010) hence ,the findings show there is no 
multicollinearity problem for this analysis. 
 
5.3  Regression Analysis 
 
5.3.1 Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Return On Asset 
 
     When this analysis is made, at first the Hausman test was run to test the hypothesis that; 
Ho: Random effect is appropriate 
H1: Fixed effect is appropriate 
According to the Hausman test, p-value is 0,043 which is smaller than 0,05 (critical value to 
reject or not) so Ho which is null hypothesis was rejected (See Appendix 1). Then by the use 
of  fixed effect OLS (See Appendix 2) test the hypothesis that; 
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Ho: All dummy variables are zero (Pooled regression model) 
H1: All dummy variables are not zero (Fixed effect model) 
Wald test was run on the regression analysis which is at Appendix 3. According to Wald test, t-
statistic is 0,052 which is higher than 0,05 (critical value) so Ho can not be rejected. Hence, the 
most appropriate method for ROA is pooled regression model (Appendix 4). This model was 
run with White cross section to remove heteroscedasticity (Appendix 5). 
 
Table 7: Ordinary Least Square (ROA) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 17:03  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 577 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.235939 0.060063 3.928208 0.0001 
BOCOM 0.015277 0.007313 2.089085 0.0371 
BOIND 0.050469 0.010005 5.044507 0.0000 
BOSIZ -0.005777 0.003677 -1.571142 0.1167 
CEODUO -0.036538 0.006221 -5.873568 0.0000 
FIAGE -0.000113 0.000176 -0.639082 0.5230 
FIRSIZ -0.020460 0.006641 -3.080937 0.0022 
     
     R-squared 0.032239     Mean dependent var 0.067881 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022052     S.D. dependent var 0.183973 
S.E. of regression 0.181934     Akaike info criterion -0.558292 
Sum squared resid 18.86692     Schwarz criterion -0.505424 
Log likelihood 168.0672     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.537675 
F-statistic 3.164748     Durbin-Watson stat 1.216066 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004618    
     
     
P-Values<0,05 ----> significant                                           P-Values>0,05 ----> insignificant 
P-Values<0,01 ---> statistically significant 
 
    
       Table 7 shows the regression results for ROA. The first column shows the coefficient of 
all independent variables which indicates the magnitude and direction of relation between 
financial performance measure (ROA) and independent variables. Column two represents their 
standard errors and column three exhibits the t-value which states the significance of the 
regression outcomes. The R-squared represents the degree or percentage up to which the sample 
describes the dependent variables and F statistics tells us the overall significance of the 
model.                                                        
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        When it comes to the comments from analysis, the findings from OLS regression clearly 
shows mixed results between independent variables and ROA. Firstly, the regression outcomes 
show that board committees and board independence are positively related with financial 
performance measured by ROA so  increase in number of  board committees and board 
independence  leads to 1,5% and 5% increase in ROA . However board size, ceo duality, firm 
age and firm size are inversely related with ROA by 0,57%, 3,65%, 0,01% and 2% respectively. 
        Except firm age and board size, all independent variables have significant impact on ROA 
according to their p-values. Especially board independence, ceo duality and firm size have 
statistically significant impact on ROA . (See Table 10 for more information about rejection or 
not rejection of hypothesis). R-squared of  0,022 indicates that independent variables explain 
2,2% of the systematic variation in the dependent variable(ROA). In addition, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is 1,22 which is close to two which means there is no autocorrelation problem 
in the sampled data. 
         A general evaluation from this analysis is that  F statistics and its p-values are 3,16 and 
0,0046 which is smaller than the critical point of 0,05 hence corporate governance variables 
are  found significantly related with ROA. 
 
5.3.2 Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and ROE 
 
      When this analysis is made, same steps were used with ROA and the most appropriate 
method was found pooled regression model for ROE. (See Appendices 6,7,8,9,10) 
 
Table 8: Ordinary Least Square (ROE) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:54  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 576 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.285181 0.145925 1.954298 0.0512 
BOCOM 0.013262 0.010860 1.221258 0.2225 
BOIND 0.199892 0.099271 2.013601 0.0445 
BOSIZ 0.002139 0.002893 0.739502 0.4599 
CEODUO -0.045885 0.024081 -1.905424 0.0572 
FIAGE -0.000199 0.000625 -0.317925 0.7507 
FIRSIZ -0.037404 0.017167 -2.178790 0.0298 
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R-squared 0.023921     Mean dependent var 0.120218 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013628     S.D. dependent var 0.419283 
S.E. of regression 0.416416     Akaike info criterion 1.097815 
Sum squared resid 98.66599     Schwarz criterion 1.150754 
Log likelihood -309.1708     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.118461 
F-statistic 2.324074     Durbin-Watson stat 1.786656 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.031658    
     
      
Board committees, board independence and board size have positive impact on financial 
measurement (ROE) .On the other hand ceo duality, firm size and firm age have negative effect 
on ROE by 4,58%, 0,019% and 3,7% respectively.        
         According to their p-values, board independence and firm size explain ROE significantly 
while board committees, board size, ceo duality and firm age have an insignificant effect on 
ROE (See Table 10 for more information about rejection or confirmation of hypothesis). 
Adjusted R-squared of this model is 0,0136 which means that the independent variables jointly 
explain approximately 1,4% of the systematic variation in the dependent variable (ROE). 
Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1,786 so sampled data do not present first order serial 
correlation problem. Overall, F statistic and its p-value of this model are 2,32 and 0,0316. This 
means that corporate governance variables have a significant effect on ROE. 
 
5.3.3 Relationships between Corporate Governance Variables and Tobin’s Q 
 
        For Tobin’s Q same steps were followed but when Hausman test was run for Tobin’s Q 
the p-value (0.0963) was bigger than critical value (0,05) so unlike ROA and ROE random 
effect was found more appropriate model for Tobin’s Q (See Appendices 11,12, 13). 
 
 
Table 9: Ordinary Least Square (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Dependent Variable: TOBIN_S_Q  
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:57  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.488890 1.644130 3.946701 0.0001 
BOCOM 0.045417 0.042604 1.066025 0.2869 
BOIND 0.580753 0.225139 2.579538 0.0101 
BOSIZ 0.036824 0.054599 0.674453 0.5003 
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CEODUO -0.342800 0.056346 -6.083830 0.0000 
FIAGE -0.000800 0.005431 -0.147313 0.8829 
FIRSIZ -0.686639 0.191595 -3.583804 0.0004 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 1.392240 0.3998 
Idiosyncratic random 1.705912 0.6002 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.044214     Mean dependent var 0.533329 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034100     S.D. dependent var 1.743861 
S.E. of regression 1.714126     Sum squared resid 1665.975 
F-statistic 4.371539     Durbin-Watson stat 1.537074 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000250    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.051591     Mean dependent var 1.239949 
Sum squared resid 2728.938     Durbin-Watson stat 0.938360 
     
      
        Board committees, board independence and board size have positive associations with 
Tobin’s Q. On the other hand CEO duality, firm age and firm size are inversely correlated with 
Tobin’s Q. In the analysis, the effects of board committees, board size and firm age are 
insignificant on Tobin’s Q however board independence, ceo duality and firm size are 
significant on Tobin’s Q (See Table 10 for more information about rejection or not rejection of 
hypothesis). In order of importance, the regression outcomes also indicate that the most 
significant relationship is  between  ceo duality and Tobin’s Q with beta of -0,343 and p value 
of 0,000. According to analysis, adjusted R-squared (0,034) indicates approximately 3,4% of 
the variability in Tobin’s Q. In addition, durbin watson test resulted with 1,53 which is close to 
2 hence the sampled data do not present any presence of autocorrelation problem. F statistics 
and its p-value which show overall significance level are 4,37 and 0,00026 which is smaller 
than 0,01. This means that overall corporate governance variables have statistically significant 
impact on Tobin’s Q.  
        In summary, these three tables try to explain the effect of corporate governance variables 
on financial measurements which are ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Although Tobin’s Q is 
strongly influenced by unstable market factors, such as investor behaviour, and market forecasts 
the outcomes  show that Tobin’s Q is the best measurement for exploring impacts of corporate 
governance variables on financial variables . This is because, it has the best adjusted R-squared 
which gives the percentage of variation explained by only corporate governance variables that 
in reality affect the financial measurements. 
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Table 10: Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis Interpretation 
Financial 
Measurement 
Independent 
Variable 
Relationship 
Direction 
Significant 
Value 
Result on 
Hypothesis 
ROA BOSIZ Negative 0,1167 Don’t reject H1 
ROE BOSIZ Positive 0,4599 Don’t reject H1 
TOBIN’S Q BOSIZ Positive 0,5003 Don’t reject H1 
ROA CEODUA Negative 0,0000** Reject H2 
ROE CEODUA Negative 0,0572 Don’t reject H2 
TOBIN’S Q CEODUA Negative 0,0000** Reject H2 
ROA BOIND Positive 0,0000** Reject H3 
ROE BOIND Positive 0,0445* Reject H3 
TOBIN’S Q BOIND Positive 0,0101* Reject H3 
ROA BOCOM Positive 0,0371* Reject H4 
ROE BOCOM Positive 0,2225 Don’t reject H4 
TOBIN’S Q BOCOM Positive 0,2869 Don’t reject H4 
ROA FIRSIZ Negative 0,0022** Reject H5 
ROE FIRSIZ Negative 0,0298* Reject H5 
TOBIN’S Q FIRSIZ Negative 0,0004** Reject H5 
ROA FIAGE Negative 0,5230 Don’t reject H6 
ROE FIAGE Negative 0,7507 Don’t reject H6 
TOBIN’S Q FIAGE Negative 0,8829 Don’t reject H6 
*: Significant impact 
**: Statistically significant impact 
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5.4 Discussion 
   
        Firstly, we found that when the  number of board committees increases ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q also increase. Increasing number of committee members, which is an important 
variable for corporate governance, means increasing disclosure of information, better protection 
of rights and better supervision of decision so increasing number of committee members 
improve the quality of good corporate governance. However, these relationships are not 
significant for ROE and Tobin’s Q. Only the effect on ROA was found significant.  
       When we compare the results with previous studies, there are lots of findings that support 
the presence of various board committees to increase firm performance. For example; 
McMullen (1996) and John&Senbet (1998)  stated that increasing number of board committees 
ensure companies to have  more powerful  internal audit so that their financial distress can be 
reduced. Also, according to Klein (1998), there is a positive association between remuneration 
committee and firm performance but it is not significant. The reason behind insignificance may 
that the members of these committees are not  independent enough since not only having 
different board committees is enough but also firms should give importance to their 
independence level. As suggested by Lam et al. (2012), in general, the effectivity of the board 
committees depend on the independence of their compositions. Since most of sampled Turkish 
companies do not disclose their independence level of board committees in their annual reports, 
we cannot confidently say that we found an insignificant relationship between the variables due 
to the lack of independent members. Still, it may be the reason or the reason might be the 
ineffectiveness of the risk management committee  that CMB recommended firstly in 2014 
which  Turkish companies must have at least 3 committees including Auditing and Corporate 
Governance and Early Detection of Risk Committees. In 2011 they required to have at least  2 
committees including Auditing and Corporate Governance Committees(See Table 1). In terms 
of carrying out this advice, while sampled data was being analyzed, it was clearly seen that 
most observations comply with CMB’s recommendations. Hence, expected that after 2011 
sampled companies would show better performance with the new committee requirements but 
having new committees could not enhance their performance significantly regarding ROE and 
Tobin’s Q. However, this finding is coherent with Tufano et al. (1996) stating that risk 
management committee is more associated with risk aversion instead of creation of shareholder 
value.  
       Secondly, the study shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between board 
independence (board composition) and firm performance in terms of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s 
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Q. The  non executive director role on the board is effectively monitoring and controlling firm 
activities regarding reducing opportunistic managerial behaviors and expropriation of firm 
resources. That is why the board independence is an important tool for corporate governance 
and firm performance. This result is not surprising ( ROA:  β=0.05, p=0,00; ROE: β=0,199, 
P=0,044; Tobin’s Q: β=0,58, p=0,01) because Turkish sampled companies comply with CMB’s 
recommendations. Also ,it was found that 424 observations are more than 0,5 which CMB 
suggests the smallest ratio for the number of non executive members over total members to be 
effective (See Table 11). This good implementation of corporate governance may  eliminate the 
agency problem by supporting the stakeholders’ interest. The reason behind the compliance 
with CMB‘s advices might be that  family owned companies companies are more likely to have 
large amount of non executive members in their board in order to have global reputation and 
enter international new markets. In other words, these kind of companies and other companies 
as well give importance to board composition because they may have profitable opportunities 
with the improvement of their corporate governance structure. A number of researches support 
our finding such as Simon&Enoghayinagbon  (2014), Abdullah (2004), Mehran (1995), 
Weisbach (1988). They found a positive and significant correlation between board 
independence and firm financial performance. However Garg (2007) stated that board 
independence does not guarantee the development of firms’ financial performance. Moreover, 
Hermalin&Weisbach (1991) and Johari, Saleh, Jaafar&Hassan (2008) found that there is no 
association between board independence and financial performance while the study conducted 
by Roodposhti (2010) in Iran and Corner et al. (2007) in USA found that increasing the 
proportion of non executive members can  decrease earning managements. 
 
Table 11 : Distribution of Non-Executive Members of Turkish Sampled Companies for year 
2008-2014 
 Number of Observations Percentages of Observations 
Board Independence<0,5 175 29% 
Board Independence>0,5 424 71% 
Total 599 100% 
(In this study there are totally 630 observations.Because of 31 missing observations, for 
board independence there are 599 observations. Without any separation among years, the 
analysis was run on total observations.) 
 
         In terms of ceo duality, the study results showcase that ceo duality is negatively associated 
with firm performance regarding the whole measurement variables. It is an important tool for 
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monitoring and protecting the rights for stakeholders. However negative impact of ceo duality 
can be explained significantly by ROA and Tobin’s Q but not by ROE. This result was expected 
because  the majority of previous studies found a negative relationship. It is also understood 
that sampled companies complied with CMB’s advice because for 78% of all observations ceo 
and chairman hold different positions in the companies (See Table 12). Holding different 
positions for CEO and chairman provide separation of  roles and duties of the management and 
board of directors. There are several past studies(Dar et al., 2011; Syriopoulos et al., 2012 and 
Fama&Jensen, 1983) that also support our result. In addition, Yermack (1996) found that firms 
that have different CEOs and chairman are more able to create value and according to 
Koufopoulos et al. (2010), since a ceo has an influential power on companies strategic decision, 
a ceo that has a dual role, affects board decisions and firm performance in a negative way. 
Unlike Koufopoulos et al. (2010) and Yermack (1996), Simpson&Gleason (1999) found a 
positive association between variables. This is because they stated that the dual role eliminates 
possible conflict between CEO and chairman and the confusion of two representatives from the 
perspective of stakeholders. 
 
Table 12: Distribution of Ceo Duality of Turkish Sampled Companies for year 2008-2014 
 Number of 
Observations 
Percentages of 
Observations 
If the Chairman and CEO are same 132 21% 
If the Chairman and CEO are not 
same 
474 79% 
Total 606 100% 
(In this study there are totally 630 observations.  Because of 24 missing observations ,for ceo 
duality there are 606 observations. Without any separation among years, the analysis was 
run on total observations.) 
 
        Fourthly, this study showcases that board size has insignificant effect on all measurements 
but its directions are mixed for different financial variables. While board size is positively 
correlated with ROE and Tobin’s Q, it is negatively associated with ROA. The result from 
regression analysis was not expected because sampled companies complied CMB’s advice. It 
is found that 94% of all observations that present board size are bigger than 5 that was set up 
as critical size for board by CMB. It is a very surprising result for ROA since most companies 
comply with CMB’s recommendations. (See Table 13).  
       Increasing board size might have two possible outcomes on financial measurement. 
Increasing  board size can cause  either the diversification of present ideas or a clash of ideas 
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and poorer connection among members. So the reason for having an insignificant relation for 
ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q and the reason of having negative relation for ROA might be less 
diversity, clash of ideas or poorer connection. Concurring with this study, Tze et al. (2015) also 
found that there is a positive relationship between board size and financial performance for 
Malaysian oil and gas companies like Simon et al. (2014), Mohamed (2009). However 
Connelly&Limpaphayom (2004) could not find any relationship between board size and 
financial performance. 
 
Table 13 : Distribution Board Size of Turkish Sampled Companies for year 2008-2014 
 Number of Observations Percentages of Observations 
Board Size<5 65 10% 
Board Size>5 549 90% 
Total 614 100% 
(In this study there are totally 630 observations. Due to  16 missing observations ,for board 
size there are 614 observations. Without any separation among years, the analysis was run 
on total observations.) 
 
         The other implication from this study is that firm size is negatively  and significantly 
correlated with all financial measurements so financial measurements can be explained by firm 
size variable. These findings are supported with several previous researches (Nenova, 2003; 
Garen, 1994). They state that larger companies need more supervision which will lead to extra 
costs for firms. Agrawal&Knoeber (1996) handle this subject with another perspective. When 
company size increases, management might lose its control on decision-making and this will 
lead to less efficiency for firms. Also Jensen and Meckling (1976) represent that large firms 
might likely cause an agency problem which would make the agency cost increase. However 
some studies (Black et al., 2006; Serrasqueiro&Nunes, 2008; Short&Keasey, 1999) show that 
there is a positive relationship between firm size and financial performance. 
         Finally, This study found  that firm age is negatively correlated with all financial 
performance variables. This result shows that younger firms are better about fitting in the 
business environment and catching growth opportunities and our findings are in line with 
Lipczinsky and Wilson (2001) and Black et al. (2006) but not coherent with Claessens et al. 
(2002), Evans (1987) and Boone et al. (2007). 
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6.CONCLUSION 
 
 
        This paper analyzed the effect of corporate governance among 90 Turkish listed companies 
between 2008 and 2014. In order to measure corporate governance effects, six variables which 
are board size, board composition (independence), board committees, ceo duality, firm size 
(control variable) and firm age (control variable) were chosen. This is because, comparing the 
same independent variables with previous studies was aimed and it was hoped that these 
variables would have influence on firm performance. On the other hand ROA, ROE and Tobin’s 
Q were selected as the tools to measure firm financial performance. 
        The aim of this study was to explore whether there was an association between corporate 
governance variables and firm performance of Turkish listed companies or not. The result of 
the study shows us good corporate governance practices significantly improve firm 
performances of sampled companies as we can understand from p-values that represent general 
significance of multiple regression analysis (P-values;  ROA; 0.0046, ROE; 0.032, Tobin’s Q; 
0.0003). From these findings, firms should understand that improving good corporate 
governance applications is a significant tool to achieve financial  sustainability, good financial 
performance and market value.  
        The study provides an important insight into the Turkish financial market and Turkish 
companies in terms of corporate governance practices. The findings in this study contribute to 
various areas; the most importantly, the result may be a good guideline for stakeholders and 
managers to understand whether companies have good corporate governance practices or not. 
Secondly, because corporate governance contributes to country’s economy and company 
performance, government might give more importance to improve the corporate governance by 
making new regulations or recommendations. Finally, unlisted firms can improve its 
compliance level with good corporate governance practices  like listed sampled firms that 
complied with CMB’s recommendations and showed better performance.  
        When it comes to the recommendations concluded from the results, they might support 
company’s notion to develop firm performance in the following ways. Unlike most of previous 
studies in this field, increasing board size improves firm market performance regarding to ROE 
and Tobin’s Q so that Turkish firms should enlarge their number of board members to have a 
more diverse ideas in order to have better financial performance. Also, the effect of board 
independence was found the most significant variable since it is both related positively and 
significantly to all measurements. Therefore, good corporate governance practices decrease 
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possible corporate issues by the help of non-executive directors in the monitoring and auditing 
process. Thirdly, board committees have a positive association with all financial tools which 
means that companies with large numbers of board committees can generate more profit than 
companies with smaller number of committees. Finally, the positions of ceo and chairman of 
board of directors should be held by different executives according to the results from the 
analysis which remarks a negative correlation with all measurements to protect interests of 
shareholders and enhance the firm value. Implementation of these advices can enhance firm’s 
financial performance and market value by attracting more capital and forming a beneficial 
business environment with a greater degree of investor confidence which might increase 
stakeholders’ wealth and the country’s financial stability. Significance of corporate governance 
will continue to increase in the following years as long as firms want to be in competition to 
survive in the constantly changing market.   
       In conclusion, in this paper we firstly aimed to show the significant effect of corporate 
governance practices on the company’s financial performance and market value. Hereby, with 
this study we accomplished our goal. We hoped that this study will be beneficial for Turkish 
companies to improve good corporate governance practices which in turn increase their firm 
performance.   
 
 
6.1 Future Directions For Research 
 
        This study might be extended in various aspects and some possible ways are identified 
below. 
         Firstly, in this paper the time period was taken as 2008-2014. In order to be more accurate, 
this time period might be extended to more than 8 years. When it comes to the other direction, 
number of independent variables can be increased to be able to include most of  the corporate 
governance indicators. Thirdly, since this study was concentrated only on Turkey, future 
research may include more than one country that is called as both developing and developed 
country like Turkey. By including more than one country, corporate governance practices and 
impacts of these countries can be displayed comparatively. Another recommendation for future 
research could be using primary data to have more reliable results. Lastly, in this paper, 90 
companies from BIST Indexes were used as sampled data however future studies may make 
the analysis by using all companies in BIST indices to give a more reliable perspective and 
generalize the findings. Another possibility to generalize the results could be using companies 
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from all sizes or all cities in Turkey. Because BIST Indices include large companies and large 
companies are generally located in big cities, companies which are run in small cities could not 
be analyzed. Hence, using various companies from different parts of Turkey would create a 
more accurate outcome to understand general perspective of corporate governance practices on 
Turkish firms.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Hausman Test (ROA) 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 17.081535 5 0.0043 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     BOCOM 0.029736 0.021245 0.000071 0.3149 
BOIND -0.053766 0.022052 0.001061 0.0199 
BOSIZ 0.003760 -0.003143 0.000033 0.2260 
FIAGE -0.001738 0.000176 0.000029 0.7221 
FIRSIZ -0.098897 -0.033144 0.000360 0.0005 
     
      
 
 
Appendix 2: Fixed 
Effect Ols (ROA) 
     
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:58  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 582 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.929466 0.271396 3.424754 0.0007 
BOCOM 0.029736 0.011096 2.679798 0.0076 
BOIND -0.053766 0.049094 -1.095165 0.2740 
BOSIZ 0.003760 0.007313 0.514112 0.6074 
FIAGE -0.001738 0.005428 -0.320246 0.7489 
FIRSIZ -0.098897 0.022203 -4.454254 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.377188     Mean dependent var 0.065913 
Adjusted R-squared 0.258496     S.D. dependent var 0.185069 
S.E. of regression 0.159364     Akaike info criterion -0.688383 
Sum squared resid 12.39368     Schwarz criterion 0.016854 
Log likelihood 294.3195     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.413475 
F-statistic 3.177880     Durbin-Watson stat 1.907031 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 17:00  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 577 
ROA=C(1)+C(2)*BOCOM+C(3)*BOIND+C(4)*BOSIZ+C(5)*CEODUO 
        +C(6)*FIAGE+C(7)*FIRSIZ  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.235939 0.071238 3.311987 0.0010 
C(2) 0.015277 0.007522 2.031052 0.0427 
C(3) 0.050469 0.031142 1.620620 0.1057 
C(4) -0.005777 0.003635 -1.589117 0.1126 
C(5) -0.036538 0.019016 -1.921404 0.0552 
C(6) -0.000113 0.000462 -0.244065 0.8073 
C(7) -0.020460 0.008486 -2.410932 0.0162 
     
     R-squared 0.032239     Mean dependent var 0.067881 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022052     S.D. dependent var 0.183973 
S.E. of regression 0.181934     Akaike info criterion -0.558292 
Sum squared resid 18.86692     Schwarz criterion -0.505424 
Log likelihood 168.0672     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.537675 
F-statistic 3.164748     Durbin-Watson stat 1.216066 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004618    
     
      
 
 
Appendix 3: Wald Test (ROA) 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic -1.921404  570  0.0552 
F-statistic  3.691794 (1, 570)  0.0552 
Chi-square  3.691794  1  0.0547 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(5)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(5) -0.036538  0.019016 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
Appendix 4: Pooled Regression Analysis (ROA) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 17:02  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 577 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.235939 0.071238 3.311987 0.0010 
BOCOM 0.015277 0.007522 2.031052 0.0427 
BOIND 0.050469 0.031142 1.620620 0.1057 
BOSIZ -0.005777 0.003635 -1.589117 0.1126 
CEODUO -0.036538 0.019016 -1.921404 0.0552 
FIAGE -0.000113 0.000462 -0.244065 0.8073 
FIRSIZ -0.020460 0.008486 -2.410932 0.0162 
     
     R-squared 0.032239     Mean dependent var 0.067881 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022052     S.D. dependent var 0.183973 
S.E. of regression 0.181934     Akaike info criterion -0.558292 
Sum squared resid 18.86692     Schwarz criterion -0.505424 
Log likelihood 168.0672     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.537675 
F-statistic 3.164748     Durbin-Watson stat 1.216066 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004618    
     
      
 
Appendix 5: Pooled Regression OLS with White Cross (ROA) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 17:03  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 577 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.235939 0.060063 3.928208 0.0001 
BOCOM 0.015277 0.007313 2.089085 0.0371 
BOIND 0.050469 0.010005 5.044507 0.0000 
BOSIZ -0.005777 0.003677 -1.571142 0.1167 
CEODUO -0.036538 0.006221 -5.873568 0.0000 
FIAGE -0.000113 0.000176 -0.639082 0.5230 
FIRSIZ -0.020460 0.006641 -3.080937 0.0022 
     
     R-squared 0.032239     Mean dependent var 0.067881 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022052     S.D. dependent var 0.183973 
S.E. of regression 0.181934     Akaike info criterion -0.558292 
Sum squared resid 18.86692     Schwarz criterion -0.505424 
Log likelihood 168.0672     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.537675 
F-statistic 3.164748     Durbin-Watson stat 1.216066 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004618    
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Appendix 6: Hausman Test (ROE) 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 12.522120 5 0.0283 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     BOCOM 0.038802 0.015645 0.000435 0.2671 
BOIND 0.168540 0.206735 0.007576 0.6608 
BOSIZ 0.008373 0.002781 0.000218 0.7046 
FIAGE -0.011743 0.000132 0.000172 0.3647 
FIRSIZ -0.219185 -0.053706 0.002778 0.0017 
     
      
 
 
Appendix 7: Fixed  
Effect OLS (ROE) 
     
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:47  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 581 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.256401 0.671608 3.359699 0.0008 
BOCOM 0.038802 0.026860 1.444608 0.1492 
BOIND 0.168540 0.118868 1.417878 0.1569 
BOSIZ 0.008373 0.017707 0.472852 0.6365 
FIAGE -0.011743 0.013174 -0.891372 0.3732 
FIRSIZ -0.219185 0.057985 -3.780009 0.0002 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.290072     Mean dependent var 0.116972 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154501     S.D. dependent var 0.419372 
S.E. of regression 0.385616     Akaike info criterion 1.079146 
Sum squared resid 72.41692     Schwarz criterion 1.785319 
Log likelihood -219.4920     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.354440 
F-statistic 2.139628     Durbin-Watson stat 2.434179 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:50  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 576 
ROE=C(1)+C(2)*BOCOM+C(3)*BOIND+C(4)*BOSIZ+C(5)*CEODUO 
        +C(6)*FIAGE+C(7)*FIRSIZ  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.285181 0.163104 1.748463 0.0809 
C(2) 0.013262 0.017228 0.769818 0.4417 
C(3) 0.199892 0.071284 2.804149 0.0052 
C(4) 0.002139 0.008321 0.257073 0.7972 
C(5) -0.045885 0.043621 -1.051914 0.2933 
C(6) -0.000199 0.001061 -0.187294 0.8515 
C(7) -0.037404 0.019454 -1.922659 0.0550 
     
     R-squared 0.023921     Mean dependent var 0.120218 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013628     S.D. dependent var 0.419283 
S.E. of regression 0.416416     Akaike info criterion 1.097815 
Sum squared resid 98.66599     Schwarz criterion 1.150754 
Log likelihood -309.1708     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.118461 
F-statistic 2.324074     Durbin-Watson stat 1.786656 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.031658    
     
      
 
Appendix 8: Wald Test (ROE) 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic -1.051914  569  0.2933 
F-statistic  1.106523 (1, 569)  0.2933 
Chi-square  1.106523  1  0.2928 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(5)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(5) -0.045885  0.043621 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Appendix 9: Pooled Regression OLS (ROE) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:53  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 576 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.285181 0.163104 1.748463 0.0809 
BOCOM 0.013262 0.017228 0.769818 0.4417 
BOIND 0.199892 0.071284 2.804149 0.0052 
BOSIZ 0.002139 0.008321 0.257073 0.7972 
CEODUO -0.045885 0.043621 -1.051914 0.2933 
FIAGE -0.000199 0.001061 -0.187294 0.8515 
FIRSIZ -0.037404 0.019454 -1.922659 0.0550 
     
     R-squared 0.023921     Mean dependent var 0.120218 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013628     S.D. dependent var 0.419283 
S.E. of regression 0.416416     Akaike info criterion 1.097815 
Sum squared resid 98.66599     Schwarz criterion 1.150754 
Log likelihood -309.1708     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.118461 
F-statistic 2.324074     Durbin-Watson stat 1.786656 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.031658    
     
      
 
Appendix 10: Pooled Regression OLS with White Cross (ROE) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:54  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 576 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.285181 0.145925 1.954298 0.0512 
BOCOM 0.013262 0.010860 1.221258 0.2225 
BOIND 0.199892 0.099271 2.013601 0.0445 
BOSIZ 0.002139 0.002893 0.739502 0.4599 
CEODUO -0.045885 0.024081 -1.905424 0.0572 
FIAGE -0.000199 0.000625 -0.317925 0.7507 
FIRSIZ -0.037404 0.017167 -2.178790 0.0298 
     
     R-squared 0.023921     Mean dependent var 0.120218 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013628     S.D. dependent var 0.419283 
S.E. of regression 0.416416     Akaike info criterion 1.097815 
Sum squared resid 98.66599     Schwarz criterion 1.150754 
Log likelihood -309.1708     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.118461 
F-statistic 2.324074     Durbin-Watson stat 1.786656 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.031658    
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Appendix 11: Hausman Test (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 9.339868 5 0.0963 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     BOCOM -0.051978 0.069596 0.007730 0.1667 
BOIND 0.341911 0.665748 0.087845 0.2746 
BOSIZ 0.067297 0.043374 0.002919 0.6579 
FIAGE 0.106518 -0.000602 0.003268 0.0610 
FIRSIZ -1.080060 -0.679523 0.034217 0.0304 
     
      
 
Appendix 12: Random Effect (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Dependent Variable: TOBIN_S_Q  
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:56  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.488890 1.293331 5.017191 0.0000 
BOCOM 0.045417 0.081169 0.559544 0.5760 
BOIND 0.580753 0.441133 1.316506 0.1885 
BOSIZ 0.036824 0.057383 0.641726 0.5213 
CEODUO -0.342800 0.277875 -1.233647 0.2178 
FIAGE -0.000800 0.009842 -0.081290 0.9352 
FIRSIZ -0.686639 0.152138 -4.513253 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 1.392240 0.3998 
Idiosyncratic random 1.705912 0.6002 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.044214     Mean dependent var 0.533329 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034100     S.D. dependent var 1.743861 
S.E. of regression 1.714126     Sum squared resid 1665.975 
F-statistic 4.371539     Durbin-Watson stat 1.537074 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000250    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.051591     Mean dependent var 1.239949 
Sum squared resid 2728.938     Durbin-Watson stat 0.938360 
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Appendix 13: Random Effect with White Cross (Tobin’s Q) 
Dependent Variable: TOBIN_S_Q  
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/16   Time: 16:57  
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 89  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.488890 1.644130 3.946701 0.0001 
BOCOM 0.045417 0.042604 1.066025 0.2869 
BOIND 0.580753 0.225139 2.579538 0.0101 
BOSIZ 0.036824 0.054599 0.674453 0.5003 
CEODUO -0.342800 0.056346 -6.083830 0.0000 
FIAGE -0.000800 0.005431 -0.147313 0.8829 
FIRSIZ -0.686639 0.191595 -3.583804 0.0004 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 1.392240 0.3998 
Idiosyncratic random 1.705912 0.6002 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.044214     Mean dependent var 0.533329 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034100     S.D. dependent var 1.743861 
S.E. of regression 1.714126     Sum squared resid 1665.975 
F-statistic 4.371539     Durbin-Watson stat 1.537074 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000250    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.051591     Mean dependent var 1.239949 
Sum squared resid 2728.938     Durbin-Watson stat 0.938360 
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Appendix 14:  
 
    
 
 
 
 
Sampled Companies      
      
ANADOLU EFES PRYSMIAN KABLO FORD OTOSAN KARTONSAN SODA SANAYİİ YAZICILAR HOLDİNG 
AFYON CIMENTO BRISA ASLAN ÇİMENTO KOÇ HOLDİNG TAT GIDA VESTEL 
AKENERJI BORUSAN GÖLTAŞ CEMENT KONYA ÇİMENTO TAV HAVALİMANLARI ZORLU ENERJİ 
AKSA ENERJI COCA COLA GOOD YEAR KORDSA GLOBAL TURKCELL DESA DERİ 
AKSA ÇİMSA PINAR ET VE UN KOZA ALTIN TÜRK HAVA YOLLARI PINAR SU 
ALARKO HOLDING ÇELEBİ GSD HOLDING KARDEMİR TEKFEN HOLDİNG PINAR SÜT 
ALCATEL LUCEN 
TELETAS ALKIM KAGIT 
GÜBRE 
FABRİKALARI LOGO YAZILIM 
TOFAŞ OTOMOBİL 
FABRİKALARI İZOCAM 
ALKIM ALKALI DEVA HOLDING ÇEMTAŞ METRO HOLDİNG TORUNLAR TURCAS PETROL 
SISE CAM DOGUS OTOMATIV IHLAS HOLDING MIGROS TICARET TRAKYA CAM NET HOLDİNG 
ANADOLU CAM DERİMOD ADEL KALEMCİLİK OTOKAR TÜRK TELEKOM BAK AMBALAJ 
ARCELIK DOĞAN HOLDİNG BATI ÇİMENTO PARSAN TÜRK TRAKTÖR SELÇUK ECZA DEPOSU 
ASELSAN ECZACIBAŞI İLAÇ HOLDİNG 
DOĞAN 
GAZATECİLİK PEGASUS TÜPRAŞ YEŞİL YAPI 
AYEN ENERJI 
ECZACIBAŞI YATIRIM 
HOLDİNG ERBOSAN SABANCI HOLDİNG VAKKO ADANA ÇİMENTO 
AYGAZ EGE ENDUSTRI KARSAN OTOMOTİV 
VESTEL BEYAZ 
EŞYA HÜRRİYET GAZETESİ SARKUYSAN 
BAGFAS AKÇANSA ENKA İNŞAAT ERDEMIR BIM 
BOSCH FREN 
SİSTEMLERİ 
